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Civil Procedure-Jurisdiction of Transitory Actions-Effect of Re-
striction of Venue After Voluntary Nonsuit
Generally speaking, a liberal attitude is taken in the United States
towards allowing a plaintiff to take a voluntary nonsuit or to dismiss
his action without prejudice.1 However, there have undoubtedly been
many instances in which plaintiffs have taken advantage of this liberality
in order to obtain a change of venue when such change would not
otherwise be possible.
Attempts to correct this abuse without restricting the plaintiff's right
to take a voluntary nonsuit can be found in statutes and court orders
which provide that, after such dismissal or nonsuit, a subsequent suit
on the same cause of action may be brought only in the court which
granted the nonsuit or dismissal. A problem then arises as to whether
such a statute or court order precludes the plaintiff's bringing a suit
on the same cause of action in the courts of another state, or in the
federal courts, if such courts would otherwise have jurisdiction. This
problqm was considered in two recent cases wherein it was decided
that the subsequent action would not be precluded.
2
One of these cases arose under a Virginia statute.3 The suit was
brought in federal district court in Virginia by a citizen of Ohio against
a citizen of Virginia to recover damages for personal injuries. The
district court dismissed the action on the ground that a dismissal of
"', . .nearly three-fourths of the states give the plaintiff the absolute right
to halt proceedings, discontinue his action, and return again at a more convenient
time upon the same issues, even though the trial was well commenced, or in fact,
nearly over." 37 VA. L. REv. 969, 986 (1951).
North Carolina is one of the most liberal states in this respect. Plaintiff
has the right to take a nonsuit any time before the rendition of the verdict. He
may then institute a new action within one year from the date of the nonsuit.
N. C. Gz. STAT. §§ 1-25, 1-224 (1953). Briley v. Roberson, 214 N. C. 295, 199
S. E. 73 (1938).
Taking a volutary nonsuit in federal court is within the discretion of the
district judge unless it is taken before answer or by stipulation of all parties. FED.
R. Crv. P. 41(a).
The terms "dismissal" and "nonsuit," unless otherwise indicated, are used
synonymously herein, as they generally are. Wetmore v. Crouch, 188 Mo. 647,
87 S. W. 954 (1905) ; 27 C. J. S., Dismissal and Nonsuit § 1 (1941).
2 As both of these cases appear to be decisions of first impression, the purpose
of this note will be to point out the analogous situations and decisions which may
be considered precedents for these decisions and to show that they represent ex-
tensions of the rules set forth in the analogous decisions.
IVA. CODE § 8-220 (1950), which provides that: ". . . after a non-suit no new
proceeding on the same cause of action shall be had in any court other than that
in which the non-suit was taken, unless that court is without jurisdiction, or not
a proper venue, or other good cause be shown for proceeding in another court."
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a prior suit on the same cause of action in a Virginia state court pre-
cluded plaintiff's suit in the district court by reason of the Virginia
statute.4  This decision was reversed by the Court of Appeals for the
the 4th Circuit which held, per Parker, Chief Judge, that: "the effect
of the statute is merely to limit the venue of any new action on the
cause of action nonsuited; and, of course, a state venue statute can have
no application to the courts of the United States."5
In the other case, an order of a South Carolina trial court which
granted the dismissal attempted to restrict any subsequent actions on the
same cause of action to that court. However, the Supreme Court of
North Carolina held that the plaintiff was not precluded from suing
on the same transitory cause of action 6 in the courts of North Carolina.
7
For purposes of discussion, the problem raised in these two cases
can be considered from two aspects: (A) the res judicata effect of a
nonsuit or dismissal which is prejudicial to plaintiff's rights to the ex-
tent of restricting the venue of a subsequent action on the same cause
of action; and (B) the validity of attempts by the courts or legislature
of one state to restrict the venue of a cause of action of which the courts
of other states or the federal courts are otherwise competent to take
jurisdiction.
In both of the principal cases it is obvious that the nonsuits granted
were not intended to bar subsequent actions altogether, but were in-
tended merely to restrict the venue of subsequent actions. There seems
to be no reason, therefore, why the nonsuits in these cases cannot be
brought within the general rule that a judgment of dismissal or non-
'Popp v. Archbell, 108 F. Supp. 571 (E. D. Va. 1952).
Popp v. Archbell, 203 F. 2d 287, 288 (4th Cir. 1953). The decision also
overrules Buchanan v. Norfolk Taxi-Cab Corp., 95 F. Supp. 810 (E. D. Va.
1951), wherein the same construction was given to the statute as in the District
Court's opinion in Popp v. Archbell, 108 F. Supp. 571 (E. D. Va. 1952).
' "Transitory" actions are personal actions; the transactions on which they are
based might take place anywhere; "local" actions, on the other hand, are based
on transactions which could occur only in some particular place. The test as
to whether actions are transitory or local is in the nature of the subject of the
injury, not in the cause of the injury nor the place at which the cause of action
arises. Brady v. Brady, 161 N. C. 325, 326, 77 S. E. 235, 236 (1913) ; McLeod v.
Connecticut & P. R. Co., 58 Vt. 727, 733, 734, 6 Atl. 648, 649, 650 (1886).
T Howle v. Twin States Express, Inc., 237 N. C. 667, 75 S. E. 2d 732 (1953).
Plaintiff, a resident of Tennessee, brought an action in North Carolina Superior
Court against defendant, a North Carolina corporation, for damages for personal
injuries sustained in an automobile accident in South Carolina. Plaintiff had
previously brought an action in the South Carolina Court of Common Pleas.
That court had granted plaintiff a voluntary nonsuit with limited prejudice, that
is, with the right to renew the action in that county only, but without the right
to bring the action in another county. The trial judge granted the dismissal in
this form because he found that ". . . there is no denial of the defendant's asser-
tion that the underlying purpose of the voluntary nonsuit is to bring the action
in another county." (Emphasis supplied.) 237 N. C. 667, 668, 75 S. E. 2d 732,
734 (1953). In the suit in North Carolina, the trial court allowed defendant's
plea in abatement based on this order. The North Carolina Supreme Court re-
versed.
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suit in a state court which is not an adjudication of the merits of the
controversy will not support a plea of res judicata and will not bar a
subsequent action on the same cause of action in the courts of another
state s or of the United States.9 Conversely, a dismissal which is not
on the merits in a federal court will not bar a new action in a state
court.' 0
A more difficult problem arises when the legislature or the courts
of a state attempt to restrict the prosecution of certain actions, or classes
of action, either to the courts of that state in general or to specific courts.
. An example of this is seen in early cases which arose under a statute
of the Territory of New Mexico" which provided that actions for per-
sonal injuries received in the Territory could be maintained only in
its courts. The Texas Court of Civil Appeals, however, allowed a
recovery for personal injuries sustained in New Mexico.12  The United
' Brunswick Tire Corp. v. Credit Tire Stores, Inc., 8 Cal. App. 2d 69, 46
P. 2d 804 (1935); Jones v. Supreme Lodge, K. of H., 236 Ill. 113, 86 N. E. 191
(1908) ; Collins v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 232 Ill. 37, 83 N. E. 542 (1907) ;
Wilson & Co. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 300 Mo. 1, 254 S. W. 266 (1923) ; see
In re Porep, 60 Nev. 393, 111 P. 2d 533 (1941).
But cf. Welch v. Kroger Grocery Co., 180 Miss. 89, 177 So. 41 (1937) (Plain-
tiff took a voluntary nonsuit in suit in Tennessee when the court was "in the
act of granting" defendant a directed verdict. Held: subsequent suit in Missis-
sippi on same state of facts properly dismissed as Tennessee court had, in effect,
decided defendant's non-liability.); Morrow v. Atlanta & C. A. L. Ry. Co., 84
S. C. 224, 66 S. E. 186 (1909) (nonsuit in prior action in North Carolina because
plaintiff's evidence proved as a matter of law that he was not entitled to recover,
held to bar subsequent action on same cause in South Carolina).
' Security Realization Co. v. Henderson, 120 F. 2d 449 (9th Cir. 1941) ; Am-
torg Trading Corp. v. Miehle Printing Press & Mfg. Co., 108 F. Supp. 170 (S. D.
N. Y. 1952); Jacobs v. North La. & Gulf R. Co., 69 F. Supp. 5 (W. D. La.
1946).
This decision has been reached in cases in which plaintiff took a voluntary
nonsuit after judgment for him in trial court was reversed on appeal, and case
was remanded: Gardner v. Michigan Cent. R. Co., 150 U. S. 349 (1893) ; South-
western Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Buchanan, 126 F. 2d 179 (5th Cir. 1942), cert.
denied, 317 U. S. 646 (1942), rehearing denied, 317 U. S. 707 (1942) ; Interstate
Realty and Investment Co. v. Bibb County, Georgia, 293 Fed. 721 (5th Cir. 1923);
Gabrielson v. Waydell, 67 Fed. 342 (C. C. E. D. N. Y. 1895).
For cases reaching the same result in which the dismissal was for failure
of proof, see: Brooklyn Heights R. Co. v. Ploxin, 294 Fed. 68 (2d Cir. 1923),
eert. denied, 263 U. S. 719 (1923) ; Glencove Granite Co. v. City Trust, etc. Co.
118 Fed. 386 (3d Cir. 1902); Cline v. Southern Ry. Co., 231 Fed. 238 (W. D.
S. C. 1916).
Cf. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Ammann, 296 Fed. 453 (3d Cir. 1924) (involun-
tary nonsuit); Bixler v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 201 Fed. 553 (M. D. Pa. 1913)
(compulsory nonsuit).
."E.g., Swift v. McPherson, 232 U. S. 51 (1914); Carr v. Howell, 154 Cal.
372, 97 Pac. 885 (1908); Wells v. Western Union Tel. Co., 144 Iowa 605, 123
N. W. 370 (1909).
" N. M. LAws 1903, c. 33, §§ 1-7.
"2Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Sowers, 99 S. W. 190 (Tex. Civ. App. 1906),
swit of error denied, Texas Supreme Court, March 13, 1907, aff'd., 213 U. S. 55
(1909). But cf. Southern Pac. Co. v. Dusablon, 48 Tex. Civ. App. 203, 106 S. W.
766 (1907) (distinguished Sowers case on ground that plaintiff here was resident
of New Mexico and could not disregard its laws by suing in other states when
the New Mexico statute forbade such practice).
[Vol. 32
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States Supreme Court affirmed,13 saying that full faith and credit was
given to the statute when its other conditions (concerning making of
affidavits and certain time limitations) were complied with,14 but that
the right of action could not be restricted as it was based on common-
law principles. 15 This rule was extended in Tennessee Coal, Iron &
R. R. Co. v. George'16 to include actions brought under statutes which
created causes of action not existing at common law.' The Supreme
Court said that venue was no part of the right created,' 8 and that "a
state cannot create a transitory cause of action and at the same time
destroy the right to sue on that transitory cause of action in any court
having jurisdiction. That jurisdiction is to be determined by the law
of the court's creation, and cannot be defeated by the extraterritorial
operation of a statute of another state, even though it created the right
of action."' 9
"1Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Sowers, 213 U. S. 55, affirming 99 S. W.
190 (Tex. Civ. App. 1906).
14 U. S. CoNsT. Art. IV, § 1; 28 U. S. C. § 1738 (Supp. 1949). A state is
required to give full faith and credit to the public acts, records, and judicial pro-
ceedings of every other state; but the jurisdiction of a state's courts must be
prescribed by that state's constitution and legislation, and a law attempting to
to interfere with the jurisdiction of another state's courts does not come within
the full faith and credit provision of the Constitution. Atchison, T. & S. F.
Ry. Co. v. Sowers, 99 S. W. 190 (Tex. Civ. App. 1906).
'Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Sowers, 213 U. S. 55, 70 (1909).
The distinction was accordingly made in several cases that where a statute
created a right not previously existing, a condition could be attached that suits
based on that right be brought only in courts of that jurisdiction. Coyne v.
Southern Pac. Co., 155 Fed. 683 (D. Utah 1907); see Lessenden v. Missouri
Pac. Ry. Co., 238 Mo. 247, 260, 261, 142 S. W. 332, 335, 336 (1911), appeal dis-
missed, 225 U. S. 696 (1911); Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Mills, 53 Tex.
Civ. App. 359, 116 S. W. 852, 854 (1909).
"0233 U. S. 354 (1914), affirmig 11 Ga. App. 221, 75 S. E. 567 (1912).
"7 In the George case, supra note 16, suit was brought in Georgia to enforce
a right created by an Alabama statute. An Alabama venue statute, ALA. CODE
§ 6115 (1907), attempted to confine the right to bring such actions to the courts
of Alabama. This provision has subsequently been stricken from the Code, ALA.
CODE, tit. 7 § 63 (1940).
The Georgia Court of Appeals said: "The statute of Alabama is the source
of the right on which the jurisdiction acts; but it is not the source of the juris-
diction itself. We look to the act to determine the right; but we refuse to look
to the law of Alabama to determine what rights the courts of this state will
enforce, or to fix the jurisdiction of its tribunals." Tennessee Coal, Iron &
R. R. Co. v. George, 11 Ga. App. 221, 75 S. E. 567, 571 (1912).
18 Compare the language of the North Carolina Supreme Court in Howle v.
Twin States Express, Inc., 237 N. C. 667, 672, 75 S. E. 2d 732, 736 (1953) : "It
[the order of the South Carolina court dismissing the plaintiff's action with
limited prejudice] pertains to procedure, rather than to the substance of the
cause of action."
"' Tennessee Coal, Iron & R. R. Co. v. George, 233 U. S. 354, 360 (1914).
See also, Slaton v. Hall, 172 Ga. 675, 158 S. E. 747 (1931); State ex rel. Bos-.
sung v. District Court, 140 Minn. 494, 168 N. W. 589 (1918); accord, Houston &
T. C. R. Co. v. Fife, 147 S. W. 1181 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912), writ of error denied,
Texas Supreme Court, June 26, 1912 (plaintiff not precluded from suing Louisiana
corporation in Texas although the statute which incorporated defendant provided
that actions against it could be brought only at its place of domicile).,
The United States Supreme Court, in the George case, recognized that cases
19543
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The North Carolina Supreme Court, in the Howle case, after finding
that the North Carolina courts would otherwise be competent to take
jurisdiction over this cause of action, discussed the intent of the order
of the South Carolina court and decided that the order was intended
only to prevent the plaintiff from bringing his action in a neighboring
county. The Court felt that the South Carolina court did not intend
that its order should extend beyond the territorial limits of the state,
and that the order could not have such force and effect.20  Although
the Court did not specifically rely on any authority discussed here, the
decision would seem to be an extension of the principle that one state
cannot oust another state's courts of jurisdiction of a transitory cause
of action.
However, where the plaintiff attempts to bring his second action
in a federal court, the conclusion reached must be based on different
principles.
Generally, the rule of Erie R. R. Co. v. Tompkins, 21 which requires
federal courts to follow state substantive law, does not apply to matters
of practice or procedure, including matters of venue.22  The federal
courts, therefore, cannot be deprived of the jurisdiction granted to them
by Congress, and that jurisdiction cannot be restricted, by a state law
which regulates venue in state courts,23 which confers exclusive juris-
would arise wherein right and remedy are so united that the right can only be
enforced before the tribunal designated by the act. Tennessee Coal, Iron & R. R.
Co. v. George, 233 U. S. 354, 359 (1914). For examples of such rights, see:
Mosely v. Empire Gas & Fuel ,Co., 313 Mo. 225, 281 S .W. 762 (1926) (work-
men's compensation statute); Davis v. P. E. Harris & Co., 25 Wash. 664, 171
P. 2d 1016 (1946) (same).
There are situations not within the scope of this note in which the courts of
the state in which the cause of action is sought to be enforced may refuse to
entertain jurisdiction, particularly if the cause of action arises under a statute
of another state which is penal in character or which is contrary to the public
policy of the state in which the right is sought to be enforced. E.g., Carey v.
Schmeltz, 221 Mo. 132, 119 S. W. 946 (1909).
" Howle v. Twin States Express, Inc., 237 N. C. 667, 672, 673, 75 S. E. 2d
732, 737 (1953).21304 U. S. 64 (1938).
.2 Carby v. Greco, 31 F. Supp. 251 (W. D. Ky. 1940).
However, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will not be applied in diversity
cases where such application would permit the contravention of state policy and
state law. Hoosier Cas. Co. of Indianapolis, Ind. v. Fox, 102 F. Supp. 214
(N. D. Iowa 1952).
23 Foote v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 92 F. 2d 744 (5th Cir. 1937) (rule
that only court with power to cancel a sheriff's deed of sale in execution of
judgment was the court which originally issued the execution order) ; Blunda v.
Craig, 74 F. Supp. 9 (E. D. Mo. 1947) (provision in non-resident motorists act
that suits under it must be filed in county in which the cause of action accrues) ;
East Tennessee, V. & G. R. Co. v. Atlanta & F. R. Co., 49 Fed. 608 (C. C. S. D.
Ga. 1892) (state statute providing that suits against a corporation must be brought
in the county in which its principal office is located) ; Davis v. James, 2 Fed. 618
(C. C. N. D. Ill. 1880) (state statute allowing guardians to mortgage real estate
of their wards provided that foreclosures of such mortgages could only be had
in the county court which allowed the mortgage); Cunningham v. County of
Rails, 1 Fed. 453 (C. C. E. D. Mo. 1880) (state statute providing that actions
against a county shall be brought in the circuit court of such county).
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diction of certain controversies upon its own courts or upon a particular-
court,2 4 or which ". . prescribes the modes of redress in [its] courts,
or which regulates the distribution of [its] judicial power. '25  In ac-
cordance with these principles, the Court of Appeals, in Popp v. Arch-
bell,20 decided that the Virginia statute was a statute regulating practice
and procedure in state courts and could have no effect on federal juris-
diction.
Thus, there is apparently no direct precedent for the decisions in
the principal cases. Yet, on the basis of the decisions in analogous
cases, it would seem that the results reached in these two cases are
correct and proper, in that the jurisdiction of a court should not be re-
stricted or eliminated by laws or rules governing procedure in the courts
of other jurisdictions.
JosEPH G. DAIL, JR.
Constitutional Law-Right of Counsel
The North Carolina Supreme Court has recently affirmed the con-
stitutional principle tlat counsel need not be assigned to defend persons
accused of non-capital crimes, absent special circumstances brought to
the attention of the court and revealing the necessity for counsel,-
The English common law denied a person accused of treason or
felony the benefit of counsel,2 and did not even consider the assignment
of counsel,3 while most of the original American colonies at least
nominally provided for the right to counsel.' The privilege, which has
" Barber Asphalt Pay. Co. v. Morris, Judge, 132 Fed. 945 (8th Cir. 1904)
(city charter allowing claims against the city to be appealed only to a certain
state court); Darby v. L. G. DeFelice & Son, Inc., 94 F. Supp. 535 (E. D. Pa.
1950) (statute providing that suits against turnpike commission could be brought
only in courts of certain county) ; Wunderlich v. National Surety Corp., 24 F.
Supp. 640 (D. Minn. 1938) (statute authorizing issue of bonds required suit on
them to be brought within the state) ; Brown v. Return Loads Bureau, 15 F. Supp.
1073 (S. D. N. Y. 1936) (wrongful death statute providing that actions under
it must be prosecuted within the state) ; accord, Slaton v. Hall, 172 Ga. 675, 158
S. E. 747 (1931) (held that action under same wrongful death statute could be
prosecuted in competent court of another state). Cf. Crowley v. Goudy, 173 Minn.
603, 218 N. W. 121 (1928).
As to effect of state statutes granting exclusive jurisdiction over suits af-
fecting probate or administration of decedents' estates to probate courts, see Anno-
tation, 158 A. L. R. 9 (1945).
"Hyde v. Stone, 20 How. 170, 175 (U. S. 1858) ; Lappe v. Wilcox, 14 F. 2d
861 (N. D. N. Y. 1926).
"o Note 5 supra.
1 State v. Cruse, 238 N. C. 53, 76 S. E. 2d 320 (1953).
' Herein, the general constitutional privilege concerning counsel for defense in
criminal cases is called "right of counsel," and includes: (1) "benefit of counsel,"
which means that a person may be represented by a lawyer whom he has em-
ployed; and (2) "assignment of counsel," which means that a person is entitled
to the assignment of a lawyer to defend him.
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45, 60 (1932).
'Id. at 64.
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